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PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND THE PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1966
Preventive detention of accused non-capital offenders is an often dis-
cussed, highly controversial subject. Until now the controversies have
surrounded the concept in the abstract-for preventive detention of non-.
capital defendants has never been permitted by law. In mid-July 1969,
however, at the behest of the Administration, bills were introduced in
both the Senate' and the House2 which would amend the Bail Reform
Act of 19663 to embody authorization for judicial officers to subject
suspected offenders in certain non-capital felony cases to detention be-
fore trial. Consideration of not only the likelihood of flight but the dan-
gerousness of the accused if he is released would be permitted in reach-
ing a determination.4 For the first time in United States history, under
specified conditions, a non-capital offender might be incarcerated pend-
ing trial without a right to bail.
Since this concept has come under discussion, there has been much
comment about the need for enabling legislation, whether such legis-
lation would be constitutional, and the efficacy of the legislation if found
to be constitutional. This study seeks to provide a synopsis of the pre-
cursory controversy surrounding this proposed legislation and inquire
into whether the proposal is an answer to skeptics and critics of the
idea of preventive detention-those whose opposition is based upon con-
stitutional grounds or who, indeed, question either the adequacy of
or alternatively the need for such legislation.
CONSTITIONALITY
The discussion of whether or not a preventive detention statute
would violate the Constitution centers around interpretations of the
fifth5 and eighth6 amendments. Since bail and bail procedures have been
a part of our legal system since even before adoption of the Bill of
1. S. 2600, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 115 CoNG. REC. S7908-09 (daily,
ed. July 11, 1969).
2. H.R. 12806, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-52 (Supp. IV, 1969).
4. The only recognized purpose for bail has been to ensure the presence of an ac-
cused at trial. See, e.g., Id. § 3146 (a); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951).
5. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process.
of law .... "
6. '"xcessive bail shall not be required ...
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Rights, 7 it is surprising that the Supreme Court has not yet had oc-
casion to pass on the question of whether or not there is an absolute
right to bail in non-capital cases.8 Because it has not, theories abound,
and inapplicable decisions are dissected in search of some indication of
the light in which the Court is likely to view a law which would per-
mit an accused non-capital felon to be incarcerated without bail or right
to bail.
The Fifth Amendment
The due process clause of the fifth amendment, it is argued, pre-
cludes a court from imprisoning an accused because of his likelihood
of committing "another" crime while on bail awaiting trial. The assump-
tion that he has committed the offense for which he is in custody, in-
herent in the premise that he might commit "another" crime if re-
leased, is repugnant to our legal system's presumption of innocence
until proven guilty at a trial by one's peers.9
Opposing this argument is one which would show that the presump-
tion of innocence is at once a rule of evidence and an ideal embodied in
our system of laws.'" It is a rule of evidence relating to the burden
of proof at trial." On the other hand, the presumption of innocence
upon which pretrial freedom might be based is not a factual presump-
tion but a manifestation of the ideal that one must not be deprived of
liberty without due process of law.'2 Today, the soundness of this
argument is supported by the observation that persons accused of capital
crimes or those found incompetent to stand trial are imprisoned before
trial.'s
7. The Judiciary Act of 1789, passed two years before final ratification of the first
ten amendments, specified the conditions under which bail was to be granted. See note 17
infra.
,8. The precise question of a right to bail before trial in non-capital criminal cases has
yet to be brought before the Supreme Court. Such tangential matters as bail pending
appeal or pending deportation (technically not a criminal action) have been touched
upon and will be discussed infra.
9. See Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1489, 1501 (1966);
cf. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
10. See Note, supra note 9, at 1501.
11. Id.; Hearings on Amendment to the Bail Refornz Act of 1966 Before the Subcomm.
on Const. Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (1969)
(remarks of Halleck, J., D. C. Ct. Gen. Sess.) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings].
12. Note, supra note 9, at 1501.
13. Id.; e.g., An accused murderer is presumed. innocent and his guilt must be estab-
lished at trial but no absolute right to bail is his while awaiting trial, nor does due




The eighth amendment command that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required . . ." has aroused the most passionate voices. This clause is
perhaps the most ambiguous in the Constitution,' 4 and for that reason
it is understandable that its meaning has been subjected to varied in-
terpretations. Realizing in advance that the ultimate interpretation
may evolve from a Supreme Court ruling, a summary of those that
have been proposed may be profitable.
Every interpretation of this amendment begins with an historical al-
lusion. Possibly, were it not for the nearly two hundred years of tradi-
tion underlying our system of laws, these facts of history would il-
lustrate the true meaning. But our emphasis upon the rights of the indi-
vidual and his protection from the power of the state has been nurtured
and has grown until what appears to be merely a prohibition of ex-
cessive bail is often read as an absolute right to bail.
It has been noted that our bail clause was taken from the English
Bill of Rights Act.'5 In England this clause was "never... thought to
accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to provide that bail shall
not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail." 10 The
first Congress established the right to bail in the Judiciary Act of 1789.'7
Discussion of that act and of the first ten amendments to the ConstitU-
tion occurred simultaneously, the Judiciary Act being enacted two days
before the Bills of Rights was approved.' 8 It was another two years be-
fore the amendments received the necessary approval of three-fourths
of the states and were ratified.'9 It therefore would appear that Congress
reserved to itself the right to define the crimes which are bailable, and
stipulated in the Constitution that bail for those crimes shall not be
excessive-a commonplace in English law at that time. °
14. See generally Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 959, 969-71 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Foote, Crisis in Bail]. This is an excellent,
comprehensive work by one of the recognized experts on the subject of bail.
15. 1 W. & M., c. 2 (1689); see generally Foote, Crisis in Bail, at 965-68.
16. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952).
17.... And upon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except where
punishment may be death, in which cases it shall not be admitted but by the supreme
or a circuit court, or by a justice of the supreme court, or a judge of a district court,
who shall exercise their discretion therein, regarding the nature and circumstances of
the offense, and of the evidence, and the usages of law. Judiciary Act § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91
(1789).
18. Foote, Crisis in Bail, at 971-73.
19. The necessary three-fourths of the states had ratified the amendments by De-
cember 15, 1791.
20. See Foote, Crisis in Bail at 972-74.
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Opposing this, it is said that if the bail clause does not give a right
to bail there exists "the extraordinary result of a constitutional provi-
sion being merely auxiliary to some other law, which in the federal sys-
tem must be statutory." 21 Therefore the eighth amendment must neces-
sarily be read as implying a constitutional right to bail. This implication
would be "most consistent with the historical evolution of the eighth
amendment." 2 2 Justice Black noted that if there were no implied right
to bail, the eighth amendment would be nothing but a "pious admoni-
tion." ' However, even fair-minded proponents of this "implication
theory" are troubled by the question of why, if the founding fathers
intended the eighth amendment to provide a right to bail, they cloaked
their intent in ambiguity instead of specifically reciting their desire in
the Constitution?2 4
That a recognized right to bail has existed in non-capital cases since
the earliest times is beyond dispute. While some assume, without citing
support, that this right is constitutional and unconditional in nature,
2 5 it
appears generally accepted that, in fact, it has been provided statutorily
throughout our history.26 While tradition may militate against it, there
appears no reason why the Congress cannot change even so venerable
a provision of the Judiciary Act as that concerning bail.27
21. Id. at 969.
22. Id. at 970.
23. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 556 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). This case
dealt with an alien held without bail pending deportation for violating the Internal
Security Act. As noted in the opinion, deportation hearings are not criminal pro-
ceedings nor is deportation a punishment. Id. at 537. Therefore, although the decision
was one upholding the government's right to detain until deportation, the case is not
authority for the proposition that the same right exists pending trial on criminal charges.
24. See Foote, Crisis in Bail, at 970.
25. See, e.g., Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960); see generally Note,
supra note 9, at 1500.
26. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4
(1951); 1969 Hearings 28 (remarks of Hart, J., DD.C.); FREED & WALn, BAIL rN n
UrmD STATns: 1964, at 2 (1964). Cf. Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 710 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964); Foote, Crisis in Bail, at 969.
FED. R. ClM. P. 46(a) provides that
[a] person arrested for an offense not punishable by death shall be admitted
to bail. A person arrested for an offense punishable by death may be ad-
mitted to bail by any court or judge authorized by law to do so in the
exercise of discretion, giving due weight to the evidence and to the nature
and circumstances of the offense.




Our pretrial bail laws have always had as their sole purpose the ensur-
ing of the defendant's presence at trial 2 That he might commit further
crimes or be a menace to the community if released have not been proper
considerations. A judge at a bail hearing is required to determine that
condition of release which is most certain to deter the flight of the
accused and then release him." It is clear, however, that a judicial of-
ficer will often make a sub rosa decision that a certain defendant is
dangerous or is likely to injure other individuals if he is released. l He
will then subvert both the spirit and the letter of the law and prescribe
a bail bond which the defendant is unable to meet. Consequently, the
defendant will be subjected, extrajudicially, to pretrial detention. The
system is further corrupted by the fact that the wealthy or the organi-
zation criminal may be able to meet any financial condition of release,
while the indigent person cannot.82 These individuals will be forced to
seek a bail bondsman who may or may not consider them good credit
risks and will, in actuality, determine whether or not they are to have
their freedom.- Moreover, it is socially wrong to permit a system
wherein a judge acting according to his conscience and for the pro-
tection of society, is required to circumvent bail laws to effect the de-
tention of some while the same system allows the wealthy defendant
to "buy" his way free with a bond premium.
NEED AND EFFECTVENEss
In recent years, court decisions and legislation have expanded and
clarified the rights of the individual in relation to the processes of crim-
inal law. Ideally, a balance between the protection of individual rights
and the rights of the community should be maintained. 4 Arguably,
28. See note 4 supra.
29. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 557 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting); Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951); cf. Trimble v. Stone,'187 F. Supp. 483, 484-85 (D.D.C. 1960).
30. E.g., Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (Supp. IV 1969).
31. See R. GOlDFADD, RANsom-A CRrTQtIm or TE AMMUcAc BAml SYsTmm 12 (1965);
F.ED & WAi., supra note 26, at 49; Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project:
An Interim Report on the Use of Pretrial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 67, 91 (1963).
32. See R. GOLDFARB supra note 31, at 32-91; cf. Bandy v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 11,
13 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1961); Foote, Crisis in Bail, at 963.
33. See R. GoLnr.aw, supra note 31, at 92-126.
34. Senator Sam Ervin, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights, remains unconvinced of the desirability of an unprecedented preventive de-
tention law. See Ervin, The Legislative Role in Bail Reform, 35 GEo. WASH. L. Rv.
429, 445 (1967). But Senator Ervin has recognized that ". . . during recent years we
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it is unhealthy to focus all attention and effort upon one side of the
human spectrum, upon individuals, and slight the other side, society.
On the other hand, the resources of one person are seldom the match
of those of the state. As news releases, studies, and surveys of
late indicate,35 however, there are a substantial number of persons who
commit additional crimes while released on bail pending trial. There is no
question but that government owes the governed protection from such
dangers; only the means and methods to effect this protection are de-
bated.
Besides the aforementioned constitutional argument, which neces-
sarily casts a shadow of doubt over the validity of a preventive detention
statute, objections are raised that dangerousness to the community is not
a proper consideration when setting bail; only the likelihood of defend-
ant's failure to appear should be considered.36 Those who would relent
have had a rather unrealistic solicitude for the welfare of the accused. I think that a
lot of times we have lost sight of the fact that society and the victims of crime are
just as much entitled to justice as the accused." 1969 Hearings 108. See also Id. at 18
(remarks of Hart, J., D.D.C.).
35. Most studies conducted in the bail field are similar to the Vera Foundation's
Manhattan Bail Project (see generally Ares, Rankin & Sturz, supra note 31) and have
as their objective the release of selected defendants on their own recognizance until
trial. Accordingly, following interviews and background investigations, researchers
recommend for release those they deem reasonably safe risks. Judges, of course, are
free to accept or reject such recommendations. Generally the recidivism rate among
those so released is cited when discussing the instances of crime by persons on bail,
for these are the only studies available. The statistics quoted are low, ranging from
7.5% to 20% of subjects released, but this is doubtlessly an incomplete picture. The
processes of selection appear to have secured the release of the most stable while those
who were not recommended normally remain in jail, unable to meet bail. Judge Greene
of the D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. has noted that "the statistics that have been cited vary so
widely, and are based on so many assumptions, some of them correct and some of them
dubious, that I do not think at this point anyone knows what the pattern of predicta-
bility is." 1969 Hearings 41-42. See generally REPORT OF TmE JUDIcIAL COMIzIITrEE TO
STUDY THE OPERATION OF TrE BAIL REFoRm Acr IN TE DISTRicr OF COLUMBIA (1968)
reprinted in 1969 Hearings 507; MOLLEuR, BAIL RFxoVm IN THE NATION'S CAMrrAL: FINAL
REPORT OF TnE D.C. BAIL PROJECT (1966); Rankin, The Effect of Pre-Trial Detention,
39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 641 (1964); Ares, Rankin & Sturz, supra note 31.
86. In Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483, 485 (D.D.C. 1960), which was a hearing
on the commitment of a juvenile to reform school, the court gratuitously said that
"[tihe right to bail pending trial is absolute, except in capital cases, no matter how
vicious the offense or how unsavory the past record of the defendant may be." While
there is no right to bail pending appeal (see FED. R. Crim. P. 46(a) (2)), Justice Jackson
refused to deny it in a Smith Act case and in a much quoted passage said: "Imprison-
ment to protect society from predicted but as yet uncommitted offenses is so un-
precedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that
I am loathe to resort to it, even as a discretionary judicial technique . .. ." Williamson
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in that objection to the point of allowing such a consideration, main-
rain that today there exists no judge or other person or body capable
of accurately predicting which accused might be dangerous.Y7 There
may be no adequate answer to such a charge since neither those who
make it nor those who oppose it cite any proof that they are correct.
Moreover, there have been numerous bail studies conducted3 8 wherein
certain accused persons have been recommended for pretrial release on
their own recognizance based upon background surveys and the serious-
ness of the charges against them. Researchers report that few of those
released have committed crimes while on bail.39 While these results are
hailed as proof that too many are unnecessarily detained because of in-
ability to meet bail, they might indicate a deeper truth. Since the re-
searchers have obviously, through their processes, selected the best
risks, to some degree those who remain may be said to be poor risks.
Though such a simplistic conclusion may not be fully warranted, it
may be suggested that such procedures might be used to assist a magis-
trate in making his determination.40 It may well be asserted that, armed
with these facts, and possessing experience and knowledge of people
v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282-83 (Jackson, Circuit Justice, 1950). Contra Rehman
v. California, 85 S. Ct. 8, 9 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1964); Leigh v. United States, 82
S. Ct. 994, 996 (Warren, Circuit Justice, 1962); cf. Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct.
662 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962).
37. See 1969 Hearings 610-14; Foote, Crisis in Bail, pt. I, 964, pt. IT, at 1165-66. Yet
while the predictability of future criminal conduct is questioned, there is an inherent
presumption that it is a proper and successful inquiry when considering bail on appeal.
See Fan. R. Cum. P. 46(a) (2); Rehman v. California, 85 S. Ct. 8, 9 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice, 1964); Leigh v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 994, 996 (Warren, Circuit Justice, 1962).
Though the court has the benefit of a conviction indicating a substantial certainty that
the convict is guilty of the crime for which he was charged, the rationale for approval
of attempts to predict future conduct in these instances and disapproval of attempts
pending trial is incomprehensible. It would seem that a judge, given adequate back-
ground information, could capably predict future conduct under both circumstances.
Judge Halleck, D. C. Ct. Gen. Sess, "firmly believers] that an experienced trial judge
can make such a prediction based upon adequate factual material relating to a de-
fendant's past record and his current community situation." 1969 Hearings 91. But see
Id. at 139 (statement of Mrs. Wald, Judicial Council Committee to Study the Bail
Reform Act).
38. See note 35 supra.
39. Id.
40. See FREED & WAto, supra note 26, at 57. Cf. 1969 Hearings 125 (remarks of
Halleck, J.); Id. at 139 (statement of Mrs. Wald); Foote, Crisis in Bail, pt. 11, at 1165.
The Congress has, in fact, taken a step in this direction by its passage in 1966 of the
District of Columbia Bail Agency Act, Pub. L. No. 89-519, 80 Stat. 327 (1966). The act
establishes an organization which is designed to provide to the courts of D.C. verified and
timely reports on arrested persons which will aid in the bail determination. The
agency is independent of the court and is in no manner an instrumentality of the police
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and the law, a court will consistently be correct. To offhandedly dis-
qualify a judge from making a determination of future dangerousness,
were he possessed of the above facts concerning the accused, would be
to ignore the considerable discretion he already possesses in other areas
where his decision may to no lesser degree affect the life and fortunes of
his fellow man.
Support for preventive detention legislation, albeit oblique support,
is found in the observation that it would codify that which has been
the practice anyway.41 Yet if written findings and a review procedure
were required, the rights of an accused would be improved rather than
denigrated.42
THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
The proposed amendment to the Bail Reform Act of 1966 is pri-
marily a preventive detention law. It was submitted to Congress with
knowledge of the controversial nature of the subject. Setting the stage
for the procedural aspects of the amendment is the permission granted
to a judicial officer to consider "the safety of any other person or the
community," in addition to the likelihood that the defendant might flee
or fail to appear, when determining the proper condition of pretrial
release.4 3 While the original act considerably liberalized the forms
which bail might take, and deemphasized financial conditions, such
conditions are still permitted.44 The proposal, however, would prohibit
a judge from freeing a person considered dangerous on a money bail.45
or prosecution. Since the bulk of federal criminal cases is found in Washington, the
effectiveness of this information-gathering body over a proper period of time will
no doubt shed light on the validity of the proposition that a judge, having such in-
formation at hand, can make a rational determination about the probability of further
criminal acts by an accused awaiting trial.
41. Supra note 31.
42. See R. GOLDFARB, supra note 31, at 250; FREED & WALD, supra note 26, at 111.
43. S. 2600, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), Proposed Amend. to Bail Reform Act of
1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
44. The Bail Reform Act of 1966 requires a judge to release the accused offender on
his own recognizance unless he determines such release would not satisfactorily guaran-
tee defendant's presence for trial. In that event a wide range of non-financial condi-
tions are available, any combination of which the judicial officer may impose. Financial
conditions are to be used only when no other conditions are deemed appropriate. 18
U.S.C. § 3146(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).




The obvious rationale is that, if one is indeed dangerous, the fortuity of
his wealth or connections should not permit him freedom to commit the
apprehended act.
If an accused does in fact fall into one of the categories of persons
which the proposal specifies may be detained upon a showing of prob-
able cause, 46 he will receive a formal hearing prior to a detention order
being entered.47 This hearing affords the accused the opportunity "to
present information, to testify, and to present and cross-examine wit-
nesses." 48 Any testimony which is given by the accused during this
pretrial detention hearing is inadmissible on the issue of his .guilt at
trial 9 Of course, counsel may be present at all phases of the pro-
cedure. o
It is proposed that the hearing itself shall be held immediately upon
the person's being brought before the court but that the accused may
request a continuance for up to five days during which time he may
be detained."1 A three-day continuance may be granted to the prose-
cution for good cause shown.5 2
46. The proposal narrowly prescribes those categories of offenders subject to de-
tention. There are four categories: a) Persons charged with a dangerous crime. PRop.
§ 3146A(a) (1). Dangerous crimes are specified as robbery, burglary, arson, rape and
other sex offenses, or attempt to commit the foregoing, and unlawful sale or distribution
of narcotics if punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. Paop. § 3152(3).
b) Persons charged with a crime of violence allegedly committed while on bail or
other type of release if the prior charge was a crime of violence or the person has
been convicted of a crime of violence within the past ten years. PRoP. § 3146A(a) (2).
Crimes of violence are defined as murder, rape and other sex offenses, mayhem, kidnap-
ping, robbery, burglary, voluntary manslaughter, extortion or blackmail accompanied
by threats of violence, arson, assault with intent to commit any offense or with a danger-
ous weapon, or any attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing. PRop. §
3152 (4). c) Persons charged with an offense who, for the purpose of obstructing justice,
threaten, injure, intimidate or attempt to threaten, injure or intimidate any prospective
witness or juror. PRop. § 3146A(a) (3). d) A person charged with a crime of violence
when, at a hearing, there is clear and convincing evidence that he is an addict, it is
determined that there are no other conditions or combination thereof that will reason-
ably assure the safety of any person or the community and there is a substantial prob-
ability that the person committed the offense of which he is charged. Such person will
be held in custody under medical supervision. Paop. § 3146B. The term "addict" is de-
fined in PRop. § 3152(5).
47. Psop. § 3146A(b) (1).
48. PRoP. § 3146A(c) (4).
49. PRoP. § 3146A(c) (6).
50. Paop. § 3146A(c) (4).
51. Paop. § 3146A(c) (3).
52. Id.
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The hearing seeks to determine whether the defendant falls within
one of the categories of defendants that may properly be detained,
and there must be clear and convincing evidence establishing this fact. s
The judicial officer must determine that there is "no [other] condition
or combination of conditions of release which will reasonably assure
the safety of any other person or the community." 5' Based upon all
the evidence that it has before it, the court must be satisfied that there
is a substantial probability that the accused committed the crime of
which he has been charged.55 If, based upon his findings in the hearing,
a judicial officer determines that the defendant should be detained, he
must reduce his findings of fact to writing and cite his reasons for the
order.56
Once an accused has been committed to jail pending trial under this
proposal, he is to be given all reasonable opportunity to consult with
counsel and to assist in his own defense. 57 Such assistance may require
that defendant be released for short periods of time, which would be
permitted for good cause shown. 8 To the extent practicable, he would
be confined in facilities separate from those housing convicted crim-
inals.59
The proposal requires that if the accused has not been tried within
sixty days, unless the trial is then in progress or has been delayed at his
request, he is to be released under the provisions of section 3146 of
the Bail Reform Act of 1966.60 Even before expiration of the sixty-day
period, the court may order the accused's release if the basis for his
61-detention no longer exists. In any event, persons detained pursuant
to this act are to receive an expedited trial if at all practicable.12
The proposal seeks to strengthen the authority of the court in dealing
with those who have been released on bail who violate a condition of
53. PRop. §§ 3146A(b) (2) (A), 3146B(c) (2) (A).
54. PROP. §9 3146A(b) (2) (B), 3146B(c) (2) (B).
55. PROP. § 3146A(b) (2) (C), 3146B(c) (2) (C). These sections do not, however,
apply to one who is charged with obstructing justice. See PaoP. S§ 3146A(a) (3),
(b) (2) (C).
56. PROP. §§ 3146A(b) (3), 3146B(c) (3).
57. PROP. § 3146(h) (2).
58. Id.
59. PROP. § 3146(h) (1).
60. PROP. § 3146A(d) (2) (A).
61. PRoP. 9 3146A(d) (2) (B).
62. PROP. § 3146A(d) (1).
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release. Following a hearing where the court must decide whether the
conditions were, in fact, violated, 63 it must determine that there are no
other conditions of release reasonably likely to assure the person's pres-
ence at trial or that he will not be a danger to the community.6 4 If the
determination is against the accused, he may be detained, again with
every effort made to expedite his trial."
This law would permit pretrial detention if it was judicially deter-
mined after a hearing that no other release conditions would reasonably
assure the safety of the community or the presence of the accused at
trial. The findings of a hearing which results in incarceration must be
in writing so that they are readily reviewable. The accused while con-
fined is to be free to assist in the preparation of his defense and to
receive priority on the trial docket. While there are many auxiliary
facets to the proposal, this broad approach serves to illustrate the con-
cept and to inquire into the procedures which have been established.
CONCLUSION
While the proposal in its present form may be to some highly cir-
cumspect, obvious attention has been paid to the rights of the accused.
But of note is the fact that even while attentive to the rights of the
accused, indeed even while expanding them, the interests of the com-
munity have buttressed. Moreover, although there is little doubt that
constitutional objections will continue to be raised, such assertions
should not be allowed to obfuscate the fact that this proposal
would increase the constitutional safeguards of an accused. Where he
might be denied bail for a two-month period (which occurs even with-
out this legislation) such fact is more than offset by the procedural
safeguards of the hearing which would precede his detention-and
which would be reviewable.66 Undoubtedly the system would be subject
to abuse, but such abuse would be correctable on review while the abuses
under the present .system seldom are. The proposed amendment to the
63. PROP. § 3150B(b) (1).
64. PROP. § 3150B(b) (2).
65. PROP. § 3146A(d) (1).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3147 (Supp. IV, 1969) would be amended by the proposal to allow
appeal to the court exercising appellate jurisdiction by "a person [who] is ordered
detained or [whose] order of detention has been permitted to stand by a judge of the
court having original jurisdiction over the offense charged."
19691
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Bail Reform Act of 1966 is a commendable accomplishment of balanc-
ing the rights of the individual with the rights of society. 7
HALDANE ROBERT MAYER
67. It seems fair to expect that this act, while permitting detention of dangerous
individuals, will permit the courts to become more liberal in their terms of release for
those they determine to be "safe risks." Since the Bail Reform Act encourages release
on recognizance or other non-financial terms, such conditions of release should be
resorted to almost exclusively. The practice of jailing the poor because of inability
to secure a bond should cease.
Success of this federal law should encourage state legislatures to enact similar laws or
seek constitutional changes so that all accused persons might some day be treated fairly
in the vital area of bail. (See FaEza & WALD, supra note 26, at 2 n.8 for a compendium
of state bail provisions). However, recent activity in New York indicates that change
in this regard is likely to be slow. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1969, at 1, col. 5. That
state's Penal Law Revision Commission has elected not to recommend a preventive
detention law. Besides the usual constitutional issues, one of the telling reasons for
deciding against recommendation was that such legislation "would smother the courts
in a blizzard of hearings that were not required under existing procedures." Id. at 39,
col. 3. Concern for such logistical problems is commendable but the sacrifice of a
law so remedial in nature is not. If the problem is so acute, and undoubtedly it is,
appropriate administrative or legislative action should be taken to alleviate it. The
hearings on the federal preventive detention amendment were cognizant of a similar
objection from the D.C. District Court, see, e.g., 1969 Hearings 10-11 (remarks of
Hart, J.), and it is to be expected that legislators will not enact such a law without
consideration of its practicability with respect to judicial administration. And while
it may be true that "[there are about 10 times more arrests for homicide, robbery,
rape and burglary each year in New York City alone than there are in Washington,"
N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1969, at 39, col. 5, it is to be hoped that New York and states
with similar problems will expeditiously resolve them in the interest of both the accused
and the citizenry. Improvement of our judicial system should not be postponed or
thwarted by fiscal objections.
